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In this paper, I address three questions of government financial policy:  how
should a government’s aversion to financial risk be determined, when are new
financial investments justified, and what is the optimal level of reserves in a
flexible exchange rate regime.  To answer these questions, I modify an
integrated financial model developed by Froot and Stein (1998) to describe
private sector financial policy.  Financial risk aversion in this model is due to the
potential of poor financial returns limiting an institution’s future investment
opportunities.  The potential for poor returns provides governments with
incentives to hold reserves and limit new financial investments.While governments typically hold large financial portfolios, theoretical guidance on how
governments should manage financial assets and liabilities has generally been limited
to reserves necessary to support a fixed exchange rate regime, on the asset side, and
the optimal composition of debt, on the liability side.1  This literature is of little help for a
government with a flexible exchange rate and substantial financial liabilities that are not
in the form of debt instruments (largely pension and insurance obligations).  Basic
questions that are often ignored or side-stepped include how to determine the
appropriate government aversion to financial risk, when are new financial investments
justified, and what is the optimal level of reserves in a flexible exchange rate regime.
At the New Zealand Treasury, we have had extensive debate on the level of financial
risk aversion that is appropriate for a government. In general, discussants fall into one
of two camps; those who believe that the government’s low borrowing costs are due, at
least in part, to its conservative management of its financial resources and those who
believe that the government’s ability to generate revenues, both across the economy
and through time, should make the government indifferent to financial risk.  The
strikingly different implications for financial management highlight the importance of
establishing a good theoretical framework.
Sovereign risk aversion is placed in the context of changes to the government’s
financial portfolio.  These changes revolve around proposals to make marginal
changes in the composition of the portfolio or to make small changes in the levels of
government investment.  To put these proposals in stark terms, consider the question:
Given the government’s ability to borrow cheaply, why doesn’t it invest heavily in
equities markets where returns are expected to be greater than borrowing costs?
In this paper, I describe some of questions relating to government financial risk
aversion, new investment decisions and optimal levels of financial reserves.  I place
these questions in the context of a recent model on the risk management of financial
institutions, Froot and Stein (1998).  I then show that this model can be applied to the
public sector to provide guidance, at the theoretical level, in choosing a government’s
optimal level of new financial investment and its optimal level of reserves as well as
identifying critical parameters for determining a government’s aversion to financial risk.
The Froot and Stein model relies on the assumption that borrowing costs rise with
borrowing levels.  Based on this assumption, governments have incentives to reduce
financial risk; incentives which manifest themselves in the forms of holding reserves
and diversifying financial investments.2  I conclude the paper with remarks on the
implications of the model for government financial policy.
                                           
1  By government financial policy, I am referring to the management of marketable assets and
liabilities.  Throughout the paper, I will maintain a distinction between management of financial
instruments, on one hand, and tax and expenditure issues associated with fiscal policy on the
other.
2   In the Froot and Stein model, hedging can also be used to reduce financial risk.  I omit this
aspect of the model due to the difficulties governments would have in hedging some of their
financial positions because of the scale of their holdings.2
I. Financial Risk, Investment Decisions and Reserves
Government Aversion to Financial Risk
Public sector risk aversion is a bit paradoxical. To the extent that a
government’s ability to repay is associated with its financial investments, it can
be argued that a government should be highly risk averse in order to maintain
favourable borrowing costs.  From a practical point of view, this approach is
easy to implement – the government invests in financial assets that exhibit the
same properties as its liabilities (i.e. other governments’ bonds).3
By associating a government’s ability to repay with its capacity to raise revenue,
however, a government’s investment policy for financial assets is more difficult
to determine.  The ability to generate revenues across an entire country and
across multiple generations should lead a government to a level of risk aversion
approaching risk neutrality – poor returns in any given period, or group of
periods, can be absorbed without bankruptcy.  Since temporal shocks can be
absorbed without bankruptcy, governments could minimise the welfare costs of
the financial portfolio by investing in high risk – high return securities.  From this
point of view, the Froot and Stein model provides a useful approach for
narrowing the range of potential levels of government risk aversion by
identifying a source of costs to a government of accepting financial risk.
By institutional risk aversion, I mean that the institution’s financial managers
require increased expected portfolio returns for increased expected portfolio
volatility.  While this definition of risk aversion is consistent with individuals’ risk
aversion, it is not necessarily a result of aggregating individual preferences for
financial risk.  Instead I rely, as Froot and Stein do, on the difference between
an institution’s internal and external financing costs to create a measure of
institutional risk aversion.  In this context, institutional risk aversion is a result of
borrowing costs, which rise with borrowing levels, reducing the net returns to
future investments.
Maximising the expected net returns to future investment leads institutions to
hedge financial risk, hold reserves, and take a portfolio approach to new
investment decisions.  Optimal institutional behaviour in this context represents
a trade-off between the holding costs of current reserves and future borrowing
costs.
In a public sector context, internal and external financing costs differ when the
total costs of current taxation (including deadweight costs) are not the same as
the total cost of current borrowing (discounted future taxation with associated
borrowing and deadweight costs).  That is, internal and external financing costs
                                           
3  The largest financial holdings of many governments are their own bonds.  These holdings,
which seem to be financially prudent from the perspective of individual government agencies,
may be a costly bookkeeping mechanism from a government-wide perspective and may
increase the difficulties governments face in ascertaining their total exposure to financial risk.3
are likely to differ if either borrowing costs rise with the level of borrowing or
deadweight costs rise with the level of taxation.
If the returns to financial instruments were known, a government would be able
to minimise the welfare costs of financing by choosing its levels of taxes and
financial reserves so that the marginal costs of current borrowing equal the
marginal costs of future borrowing. In the absence of known financial outcomes,
a government would be prudent to hold reserves to avoid high borrowing costs
when financial returns are below expectations.  Financial prudence, however,
has a cost in terms of higher current taxation.  The question is how risk averse
should a government be, given the deadweight costs of taxation.
A government’s financial portfolio is defined as its contractual debt obligations
and its equity and bond holdings. This definition deliberately excludes the
government’s taxing authority and its legislative expenditure obligations,
including entitlements.4  To simplify the analysis, I assume that the
government’s financial portfolio only affects individual utility through taxes.  This
approach differs from Kaplow (1994) who showed that government financial
instruments could be used to offset tax-created distortions in individuals’
financial portfolios.  In this paper, I assume that changes in the government’s
portfolio have no effect on the relative prices of financial instruments.
Financial Investment Decisions
Inter-generational equity and fiscal prudence suggest that governments, like the
private sector, should acquire financial assets as they generate financial
liabilities.   Examples of government generated contractual liabilities include
employer-sponsored pension plans and government insurance plans.  In
addition, it may be prudent for the government to hold financial assets for
potential liabilities that accrue through the government’s role as lender and
insurer of last resort.
A government may change the size of its financial portfolio through changes in
assets and liabilities or through changes in its level of reserves.  Reserves are
defined as holdings of other countries’ sovereign debt while investments are
defined as any other financial instruments.  On the liability side, the number of
beneficiaries covered by pension or insurance plans may change or the level of
benefits may change.5  Governments may choose to adjust the assets held to
meet those liabilities.  Reserves may be adjusted because potential liabilities
decline (by risk-shedding, say, through privatisation or through risk-mitigation)
or because borrowing capacity increases (say through a decline in interest rates
or debt reduction).
                                           
4  In addition, non-performing (in a financial sense) assets, such as schools and roads, are
ignored.
5   To maintain the distinction between financial policy and fiscal policy, the pension obligations I
refer to here are those that the government accrues as an employer rather than through social
policy.4
In the case of a change in investment levels, decisions on asset allocations are
often made on an agency level with little or no regard for the government’s
overall portfolio.  This entity-based approach is justifiable if the government’s
accounting system does not allow for identification of the government’s entire
portfolio but makes it difficult for decision-makers to assess the government’s
aggregate financial exposures.
Reserves
Like other government-held assets, I assume that holding reserves creates
deadweight costs for society since those reserves could be returned to
taxpayers through tax reductions.  Alternatively, reserves could be used to pay
down for governments with outstanding debt.  In practice, the level of reserves
in countries with flexible exchange rates may be the sum of the residuals from
tax, expenditure and debt policy decisions rather than the result of an explicit
weighing of the costs and benefits of holding reserves.
While there are several potential justifications for holding government reserves,6
most of the theoretical work has focused on a government’s support of a fixed
exchange rate regime.  In the model developed in the following section, I
assume that reserves are held to give a government greater flexibility in
financing new investment.  That is, I limit the following discussion to the use of
reserves for investment purposes where the use of reserves is expected to lead
to positive returns.  I do not consider cases where the use of reserves is
expected to generate externalities which may benefit the government.  For
example, government intervention in illiquid financial markets could be viewed
as an investment that will be repaid through increased GDP but not necessarily
through the return to the intervention instruments.
                                           
6  Archer (1996) identified six potential reasons for a government to hold reserves:  to intervene
in foreign exchange markets, as a transaction buffer, as a balance sheet hedge, to maintain a
financial “war chest”, to improve the financial portfolio of governments with net asset positions,
or to improve perceptions of credit-worthiness.  To this list, intervention in equity markets, as
demonstrated by the Hong Kong government, could be added.5
II. An Integrated Approach to Government Portfolio Management
In this section, I show how the model developed by Froot and Stein for private
sector financial institutions can be applied to the public sector.  After describing
how the model works, I modify the mathematics in their paper and reach similar
conclusions to Froot and Stein:  institutional risk-aversion is justified when
borrowing costs rise with borrowing levels, institutions should be concerned with
the correlations in returns between instruments, and an institution’s pre-
cautionary reserves should vary with future investment opportunities.
The main change I make is in the specification of the objective function.  A
government‘s financial portfolio is linked to its welfare objectives through its
influence on taxes and expenditures.  For the purposes of this paper, I assume
that the expenditure stream is independent of returns to the government’s
financial portfolio.  That is, deviations in financial returns from expected returns
are met with changes in debt levels first.  To the extent that these deviations are
not reversed in future periods, taxes are adjusted.
In addition, I will assume that volatility of a government’s tax stream is
undesirable so that government financial management has the following
conflicting objectives; to generate returns as high as possible and to minimise
the resulting volatility that those returns have on the tax stream.
One possible justification for a government’s desire to minimise the volatility of
tax returns is Barro (1979), who uses a quadratic deadweight cost function to
show that, for a given stream of expenditures, minimising tax volatility
maximises individuals’ welfare.  More generally, to the extent that a less volatile
tax stream may imply less volatile consumption streams for individuals, the
objective function above is consistent with intertemporal optimisation in
Ramsey-type utility functions.
There is a trade-off between modelling the effects of investment decisions on
future welfare and tractability.  One of the attractive aspects of the Froot and
Stein model is that the problem and its solution are defined in a three period
model. Solving the objective function above requires the government to
explicitly take account of the expected returns from its financial portfolio and the
effect returns not meeting expectations.
In the first period, the government chooses its level of reserves.  This choice
represents a trade-off between the expected benefits that reserves provide in
terms of future period investment opportunities and the deadweight costs
associated with the taxes that those reserves represent.
In the second period, the government chooses its level of new investment. The
returns to this new investment and to the existing portfolio determine the
investment opportunity set in the third period.  Third period investment
opportunities are constrained by the government’s resulting wealth from the6
second period and the government’s borrowing costs which are assumed to be
a function of the quantity borrowed.
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With this approach, a poor investment outcome in the second period reduces
optimal investment in the third period.  The government’s choice of new
investment in the second period is determined based investment opportunities
and costs in the third period.  Based on the investment decision in the second
period, the government then chooses its level of reserves.
While this is a three-period model, the focal point is the decision-making in the
second period.  The third period is necessary so that the decision-maker faces
the costs of a poor second-period investment outcome.  The first period, which
can be thought of as taking place moments before the second period
investment decision, is simply the decision to set aside precautionary reserves
against adverse investment outcomes.  The model is solved by working
backwards.  We first determine the optimal level of expected wealth to take into
the third period, given investment opportunities and the costs of additional
borrowing.
The government’s third period investment decision depends on its wealth, W,
(the returns to second period investment), its cost of borrowing C(B), and the
expected returns to the investment, F(W+B).  Borrowing costs are assumed to
rise at an increasing rate with the level of borrowing and total expected
investment returns are assumed to rise at a decreasing rate with the level of
investment.7  Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) show that, if F is concave and
C is convex (as assumed), then the payoff function, P, has the properties PW > 0
and PWW < 0.  The second order condition implies that the marginal returns to
the third period investment are decreasing and that a higher level of wealth
leads to a higher optimal level of investment.  The second implication is due to
the cost difference between using reserves or borrowing – higher levels of
                                           
7 Evidence supporting this characteristic of government borrowing costs can be found in
Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom (1995) and Caselli, Giovannini and Lane (1998).7
wealth allow the government to invest more without increasing the chance that it
will need to rely on relatively expensive borrowing.  The expected payoff to the
government of its third period investment decision is:
E[P(W)] = max F(W+B) – W – B – C(B)   (1)
The motivation for holding reserves is to reduce the chance of costly financing
in the third period due to poor portfolio returns in the second period.  To reduce
this risk, the government holds more reserves than if it were risk neutral.
Using a CAPM approach, a private sector investors would value of the financial
institution’s shares based on expected returns and the covariance of those
returns with the rest of the market.  In the public sector, there is no equivalent
that has the acceptance of a single factor pricing model.  To maintain simplicity,
and to build on the parallels with financial institution objectives, I take the
following approach.
As a starting point, I assume that the government’s financial portfolio only
affects individuals’ welfare through its effect on taxes.   Second, I assume that
cost of debt repayment plus taxation increase at an increasing rate with both
debt and tax levels.  With these assumptions, the government’s objective
function can be written as
Max V   =  { E[P(W)] - g cov[P(W), T] } / (1 + r) (2)
where V is the value of the government’s financial portfolio, T is the average tax
rate, g is a non-priced scale factor, and r is the government’s cost of borrowing.
In this formulation of the government’s financial objective function, portfolio
volatility is not inherently undesirable.  Rather, the financial portfolio volatility
only matters to the extent that it influences tax volatility. Taxes may be lowered
(or raised) if financial returns are high enough (or low enough).  With this
formulation, the government’s financial managers have the objective of
maximising financial returns subject to a constraint on the correlation of those
returns with taxes.8
Bohn (1990) uses a representative agent model to show that governments
should minimise the covariance between unexpected changes to taxes and the
expected rate of return on financial securities.  The use of a representative,
rational agent and complete markets makes the Bohn model difficult to apply to
a government portfolio of instruments with different return and risk
characteristics.  In the Bohn model, the government has the same objective as
the individual so the government cannot create value by holding risky assets.  In
                                           
8   While not the focus of this paper, the objective function in equation (2) would also be
consistent with a political economy story in which voters had difficulty distinguishing between
poor financial returns as a result of poor market performance and poor returns due to bad
financial management.  In the private sector context, with shareholders instead of votes, this
justification for hedging is explored by DeMarzo and Duffie (1995).8
equation (2), I take the other extreme -- changes in the government’s portfolio
have no direct effect on individuals’ financial portfolios.
Total returns are decomposed into two components; average return in excess of
a risk-free rate (m) and a disturbance term (e).  The payoff from the second
period investment depends on wealth which consists of returns to the initial
portfolio (mP + eP), returns to the new investment (mN + eN), and reserves from the
first period less the one-off deadweight (t) costs associated with holding those
reserves, R(1 - t).  The portfolio includes both assets and liabilities and the net
position is assumed to be zero for simplicity.  Government wealth is, therefore,
W  =  (mP + eP) + a(mN + eN) + R (1 - t) (3)
where  a is the amount of new investment.  The first order condition from
maximising V gives the optimal level of second period investment as:
a* =  [ mN + H g cov(eN, T) + G cov(eN, eP
 ) ] / G var (eN
 )( 4 )
where
G  º  - [ E(PWW) + E(PWWW) g cov(W,T) ] / [ E(PW) – E(PWW) g cov(W,T) ],
H  º  E(PW) / [ E(PW) – E(PWW) g cov(W,T) ]
This formulation of optimal investment is slightly more complex than the Froot
and Stein measure of new investment because I assume that the government
cannot fully hedge the systematic risk between its financial investments and the
tax stream [i.e. cov(W,T) ¹ 0].9  Institutional risk aversion is created by the
objective of minimising the effects of financial portfolio volatility on the tax
stream.  To achieve this objective, governments should take account of the
covariances of new investment returns with the rest of their financial portfolios.
Consequently, the willingness to take on new investments should be a function
of expected future investment opportunities and the deadweight cost of taxes,
as well as the expected return and variance of the investment.
Under this definition of risk aversion, the government is concerned with financial
volatility because low returns to second period investments require additional
(relatively high-cost) borrowing and lower optimal levels of third period
investment.  Since risk aversion is a function of wealth, the government’s
optimal level of new investment will depend on the scale of investment being
considered as well as the correlation of the expected returns of that investment
with the rest of the government’s portfolio.
The attractiveness of this model is that it helps to provide theoretical
underpinnings for several types of government decisions.  Currently,
government investment decisions have been on an agency-specific basis and,
                                           
9  In the Froot and Stein model, systematic risk is fully hedged by financial institutions.  This
results in H = 1 and G = –E(Pww)/E(Pw).9
frequently, relied on rules of thumb.  The approach described above is an
improvement on the standard cost-benefit approach because it provides an
explicit theoretical basis for consideration of portfolio effects of financial
investment decisions.
The financial objectives in the public sector, however, are typically based on the
perspective of individual public entities.  A government’s financial instruments
may be distributed among the central bank, the central treasury or ministerial
treasuries, pension or insurance funds, state-owned enterprises, and other state
agencies.  The lack of a portfolio-wide approach by governments suggests that
they are generating sub-optimal returns.  Implementing a portfolio-wide
approach, however, is likely to be difficult.  Equation (4) requires estimations of
expected returns, the weighting factor g, and the relationships between the
returns to existing portfolio and both new investment and taxes.
To find the government’s optimal level of reserves in the first period, we
maximise government value in the second period given the optimal level of
investment:
Max  V {W[a*(R)], R} - R
which, using the envelop theorem, yields10:
E(Pw) / (1 + r) = 1 / (1 - t)( 5 )
High reserves increase deadweight costs but they also increase the expected
net return to investments.  The optimal level of reserves represents a trade-off
between the opportunity costs of holding reserves and the additional investment
return expected from holding reserves.  Reserve levels in equation (5) vary with
the deadweight-inclusive cost of taxation.  If tax rates fall, the deadweight-
inclusive cost of taxation is expected to fall.  This model suggests that the
optimal level of reserves has fallen as well.11  More generally, countries with
low levels of reserves or limited borrowing capacity cannot rely on the behaviour
of countries with more robust finances as investment role models – poorer
countries should make smaller and lower risk investments.
                                           
10   In the Froot and Stein model, expected returns are not discounted.  I believe this is an
omission on their part.
11  In New Zealand dollar terms, Treasury reserves have in fact been falling (from $4.3 billion at
the end of 1996 to $2.7 billion in January 1999) but Reserve Bank reserves have increased over
this period from $3.8 billion to $4.6 billion.10
III. Concluding Remarks
The Froot and Stein model is attractive because it explains the risk aversion of
financial institutions – the wide spread use of financial hedges, the
diversification of investments, and the holding of significant levels of reserves.
Governments carry out many of the same functions as financial institutions,
notably providing insurance and pension services.  Yet governments have been
slower to actively hedge market risk and generally do not view investment
decisions and reserve levels from a portfolio perspective.
I believe that this model is an important step in the development of a theoretical
framework grounds for integrated financial management. For a government, the
practical implications of the model are:
·  The government’s aversion to financial risk is a function of its entire
portfolio, and the investment opportunities associated with that portfolio.
·  Investment policy should be based on a set of parameters that will change
over time.  Consequently, decisions on reserve levels and investments
should be reviewed on a regular basis and should reflect expectations of
future public investment opportunities.
·  Asset allocations and reserve levels of one country do not necessarily
provide guidance for other countries.
Government risk aversion in this model does not fall neatly into a category of
risk minimisation or risk neutrality.  Instead, a government’s financial managers
must weigh the costs of holding reserves, in terms of the deadweight costs they
impose, against the costs of increased borrowing if financial returns be less
than expected.  This approach does not rule out equity investments by
governments but it does suggest that the level of such investments should
depend on both the government’s borrowing capacity and the likely correlation
of equity performance with its tax revenue.
The tight constraints of the model are an indication of the complexity of the
problem -- at a minimum, three periods are needed to define the investment
decision problem and, even then, we have only described the optimal behaviour
for a single period.  An improvement would be a model in which the investment
decisions overlap so that the government is choosing reserve levels, new
investment, and hedging levels in each period.11
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